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ABSTRACT

Written for a symposium honoring Steve Burbank’s contributions to procedure scholarship, this Essay takes Geoff
Hazard’s monograph, Research in Civil Procedure, as its point of departure. Hazard was remarkably prescient
in forecasting our modern predicament, posing timeless questions about the role of history and doctrine, the emphasis
on normative claims and law reform, the centrality of legal theory, and the rise of empirical and other disciplinebased scholarship. After surveying the challenges facing legal scholars, procedural and otherwise, the Essay
concludes with a note of appreciation for Burbank’s ability to couple a command of doctrinal nuance with
sophisticated empirics in crafting a powerful account of the variegated institutions of procedural law reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since law found a home in the nineteenth-century university, law
professors have struggled to make scholarly contributions to knowledge from
inside the discursive tradition of legal practice. Dean Langdell, under
pressure to deliver a form of legal science to match the other sciences on offer
in Harvard yard, eventually landed on the case as the unit of analysis.1
Today, the case method remains alive as a pedagogical device, but legal
realism has widened the gap between the academic profession and daily
practice of law. Chief Justice John Roberts could hardly contain his dismay
at the suggestion that the Court should consider political science data
(“sociological gobbledygook”) in the course of deciding whether one political
party had gone too far in gerrymandering Wisconsin’s voting districts.2
The Chief Justice’s dismissal of academic law represents only the latest in
a series of laments from bench and bar about the declining relevance of legal
scholarship. Inspired by somewhat the same dismay, Judge Harry Edwards
(a former law professor) published a much-discussed criticism of academic
law that touched a nerve in the 1990s.3 Some years earlier, Thomas Bergin
had chronicled the professional challenges facing law professors who were
obliged both to train future lawyers and contribute to legal knowledge.4
Other lapsed academics, too, have recognized the growing gap between legal
scholarship and legal doctrine. Judge Richard Posner described the decline
of law as an autonomous discipline, imagining a future in which more law
professors would operate from within such academic disciplines as economics
and political science.5
1

2
3

4

5

Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895, wrote a
casebook on contract law, the first edition of which contained only cases, albeit cases carefully
selected and arranged. Later editions included some narrative material. For Langdell’s famous
claim that the library served as the laboratory for law students and practitioners, see Christopher
Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. 123, 124 (1887). For a reflection on Langdell’s
scientific approach to law and the reaction of Holmes, see Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes, Langdell and
Formalism, 15 RATIO JURIS 26 (2002).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-11161)
(reflecting the remarks of Chief Justice Roberts).
See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 34 (1992) (arguing that the disjunction between legal education and legal practice “calls
into question our status as an honorable profession.”).
See Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637, 638 (1968)
(lamenting the intellectual schizophrenia entailed by the law professor’s obligation to train lawyers
in doctrine and to contribute to legal knowledge).
See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV.
761, 778–80 (1987) (outlining several implications of the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of the
legal academy).
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Just before the law-and-economics revolution that Posner helped to
initiate, Geoffrey Hazard wrote a piercing monograph on scholarship in the
field of procedure.6 In it, Hazard set the terms of debate over what counts as
valuable in the scholarship of adjective law, cataloging a variety of different
approaches and commenting trenchantly on their contributions and
shortcomings.7 Hazard wrote from inside the law school and understood the
impact of the profession’s workways on the production of serious
scholarship.8 He worried, even then, that law professors concerned
themselves with having written something rather than having said
something.9
Writing in the hope of saying something in honor of consummate
proceduralist Stephen Burbank, I’m delighted to take this opportunity to
reflect on the past and future of procedure scholarship. As Hazard observed,
and as Burbank has modeled in a storied career that one can only hope will
continue for years to come, procedural scholarship begins with a complete
command of the subject. Such command often requires an understanding of
the historical origin and current operation of legal doctrines: Hazard
journeyed deeply into the past to uncover what it means to be a party to
litigation just as Burbank has spent countless hours in the archives,
uncovering federal procedure’s origin story.10 But the best such scholarship
must also speak to the problems we face today. It must, in Hazard’s words,
be “[t]ruthful, aesthetically pleasing, . . . responsible and open with
normative and policy judgments” and it must make a “contribution to the
literature.”11 Some might say that scholarship must sing.
How to make that contribution remains the central question for
procedure scholars, especially those writing in the shadow of such figures as
Hazard and Burbank. Hazard identifies four problems that scholars in

6
7
8

9

10

11

See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1963) (copy on file with author).
Id.
See id. at 59–60 (describing law schools as too small to allow faculty members to discharge their
teaching duties and devote time to serious scholarship). Faculty size has grown considerably since
Hazard wrote and teaching loads have declined. Today, Northwestern has over 100 full-time law
faculty, as compared to the 30 we employed in 1960. See AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
41 (1960) (listing 30 full-time faculty members).
See HAZARD, sura note 6, at 56 (“With respect to faculty work, I think frankly that many of those
who have published are more concerned with having written something than having said
something.”).
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural
Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1961); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
See HAZARD, supra note 6, at 7.
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procedure should consider: the uses of history, the tendency toward an
emphasis on legal reform, the role of empirical research, and the
contributions of procedural theory.12 That list of considerations will inform,
and help to organize, my approach here. I will begin as I often do with a page
of history, one offered to illuminate both the value of deep learning in
procedure and the possibility that the best scholarship can make normative
arguments that improve the law. Then I will tackle the important and
growing divide between doctrinal and empirical scholarship and its impact
on law school hiring priorities and research outcomes. Theory may help
explain why doctrine continues to play so important a role in public law. The
essay concludes with a reflection on the possibility of a future in which
procedure scholars combine the legal and normative sophistication of the law
professor with the empirical tools of a social scientist. Much the way Steve
Burbank has been doing right along.
I. SCHOLARSHIP AND LAW REFORM
Few legal scholars can claim to have left a decisive mark on the evolution
of the law. Edwin Borchard left four such marks: on international law, on the
problem of wrongful convictions, on government suability in tort, and, most
central to this account, on the declaratory judgment.13 Indeed, it’s perhaps
not too much to say that we owe the modern recognition and acceptance of
the declaratory judgment to Borchard’s tireless work on behalf of the
remedy.14 He wrote a series of articles and books on the topic, drafted both

12
13

14

Id.
Edwin Borchard was remembered in a volume of the Yale Law Journal, where his colleague and
friend Charles Clark (head of the first federal civil rules committee and later a judge on the Second
Circuit) wrote a tribute. See Charles E. Clark, Edwin Borchard, 60 YALE L.J. 1071–72 (1951). See also
Herbert W. Briggs, In Memoriam: Edwin M. Borchard, 1884–1951, 45 AM. J. INT’L. L. 708–09
(1951). Borchard contributed to a wide range of subjects, including the legality of declaratory
judgments, Edwin M. Borchard, The Next Step beyond Equity: The Declaratory Action, 13 U. CHI. L. REV.
145 (1946); Edwin M. Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 561
(1931); government liability in tort, Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1–3), 34
YALE L.J. 129, 229 (1925); criminal justice reform, EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Yale Univ. Press 1932); and international law, Edwin
M. Borchard, Treaty-Making Power as Support for Federal Legislation, 29 YALE L.J. 445 (1920); Edwin
Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664 (1944). Borchard served
on the ACLU’s national committee, and publicly joined an amicus brief in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). Marvin Zalman, Edwin Borchard’s Innocence Project: The Origin and Legacy of His
Wrongful Conviction Scholarship, 1 WRONGFUL CONVICTION L. REV. 124, 132 (2020).
Numerous state and federal courts have dubbed Borchard the “father of the declaratory judgment
in the United States.” See, e.g., United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Koch, 102 F.2d 288, 290 (3d Cir.
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a uniform law for state adoption and the federal declaratory judgment act
statute, and defended the constitutionality of the proceeding against
challenges based on a restrictive conception of the Article III case-orcontroversy requirement.15 One can only nod in agreement with sentiments
expressed by his colleague at Yale Law School, Charles Clark. Clark
described Borchard’s work on the declaratory judgment as “the greatest oneman job of legal reform to occur in this country.”16
Born in 1884, Borchard was educated in New York City just as the
nineteenth century was giving way to the twentieth and waves of populism
and progressivism were rolling across the nation. Instinctively liberal, in a
left-of-center sense, Borchard graduated from New York Law School in
1905, and then completed his BA and Ph.D at Columbia. After stints in
Washington, D.C. as the librarian of Congress and a solicitor in the
Department of State, Borchard returned briefly to New York as a bank
lawyer before accepting a professorship at Yale in 1917. Borchard would
remain in that position for thirty-three years, retiring just before his death in
1951.
Borchard’s work on the declaratory judgment reflected deep learning in
civil law.17 The civilians had long since recognized the value of a declaratory
proceeding, one that allows the parties to secure a definite statement of their
legal relations as a way to order their affairs.18 But as Borchard recognized,
the common law tradition tended to emphasize the “wrong” as a central
element of the events that gave rise to a right to pursue a claim in the courts.19
Declaratory judgments in their most important sense operated to allow suit
to proceed in the absence of any consummated wrong:
The distinctive feature of this second group [of declaratory proceedings] is
that no “injury” or “wrong” need have been actually committed or

15

16
17

18

19

1939); Panama Process, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 362 F. Supp. 735, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Mayor of
El Dorado v. El Dorado Broad. Co., 260 Ark. 821, 837, 544 S.W.2d 206 (1964).
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 571 n. 4 (1983) (“Professor Borchard wrote a continuous succession of other articles
on the subject and was one of the draftsmen of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. He also wrote the definitive treatise.”).
See Clark, supra note 13, at 1072.
Footnotes in his treatise canvas French and German legal sources and often range more widely. See
EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941) [hereinafter DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS].
For an account of the civil law origins of the Scottish declarator action, see James E. Pfander,
Standing to Sue: Lessons from Scotland’s Actio Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493 (2017). Borchard described
the declaratory judgment as having been a part of Scots law for 400 years. See DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 1045.
See DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 5–7.
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threatened in order to enable the plaintiff to invoke the judicial process; he
need merely show that some legal interest or right of his has been placed in
jeopardy . . . .20

Rejecting the idea that a right of action arose only as a form of redress
for completed wrongs, Borchard saw a role for courts in providing a definitive
statement of legal relations after a cloud had been cast upon one party’s
perceived legal entitlements.
Under Borchard’s influence, state legislatures and courts came to accept
the declaratory judgment as an indispensable form of relief. For example,
Borchard wrote critically of an early Michigan court decision that had
characterized declaratory relief as inconsistent with the judicial role and then
applauded later decisions in which the same court reversed course.21 After
several years of state experience, the federal statute was signed into law in
1934, under Borchard’s tutelage, and was promptly incorporated into federal
practice in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22 Rule 57 set forth general
guidelines for practice in applications for declaratory relief, clarifying that the
right to trial by jury would govern in appropriate circumstances.23 The
accompanying committee note made extensive references to declaratory
practice in the state courts and went so far as to suggest that Borchard’s own
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act was to provide a “guide to the scope and
function of the federal act.”24
Yet Borchard still had to defend the declaratory judgment from the
argument that it entailed an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power.
Applying what had come to be known as the case-or-controversy
requirement, federal courts had come increasingly to insist that their role was
limited to the resolution of concrete disputes between adverse parties.25 An
influential summary of these emerging doctrines, many of them rooted in
claims about the nature of the judicial power, appeared in Justice Brandeis’s

20
21
22
23
24

25

Id. at 27.
See Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment as an Exclusive or Alternative Remedy, 31 MICH. L. REV.
180 (1932) (criticizing Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19 (1932)).
See Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (1982));
FED. R. CIV. P. 57.
FED. R. CIV. P. 57 (“These rules govern the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment under
28 U.S.C. section 2201. Rules 38 and 39 govern a demand for a jury trial.”).
See DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at app. (setting forth the legislative history of the
federal declaratory judgment act and the original language of Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
See, e.g., Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 76 (1927) (dismissing a claim brought
under the Kentucky declaratory judgment act because the state had not threatened to enforce the
allegedly unconstitutional law, making the claim too abstract for adjudication).
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well-known opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.26 Brandeis
included on his list of concerns both the standing doctrine and the
prohibition against the adjudication of collusive or non-adversarial suits:
The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is
legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought
that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer
to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.27

In emphasizing the need for a vital contest, Brandeis sought to ward off
collusive challenges to the constitutionality of federal law. But the emphasis
on concrete disputes between adversaries would pose a threat to declaratory
proceedings as well, which seek to facilitate an adjudication before the parties
change positions in ways that produce a concrete injury.28
A related question arose as to the advisory character of the declaratory
judgment. On this view, the judicial power entailed the issuance of decrees
of a coercive nature.29 A judgment for money was subject to execution
through the award of process to authorize seizure and sale of the debtor’s
assets.30 A decree granting injunctive relief directed the defendant to take (or
refrain from taking) specified action on pain of contempt.31 By contrast, a
declaratory judgment was understood to specify the respective rights of the
parties without issuance of process to secure money damages or a coercive
injunctive decree.32 Some jurists viewed the issuance of coercive relief (an
award of damages or an injunctive decree) as a defining feature of
adjudication; lacking this element of coercion, declaratory judgments were
sometimes viewed as a prohibited form of advisory opinion.33

26
27
28

29

30
31
32
33

Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
Id. at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143
U.S. at 345).
See Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274, 290 (1928) (Brandeis, J.) (noting that a resort
to equity when no case or controversy existed was “a proceeding which was unknown to . . . English
. . . courts”). For background on Willing, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 128–32 (2000).
The term “coercive relief” is often used by courts to distinguish injunctive and monetary remedies
from a declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 328 (1962).
See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 864–81 (5th ed. 2019) (providing an overview of the collection of money judgments).
See id. at 787–803 (cataloging forms of contempt to enforce injunctions).
On the nature of declaratory relief, see Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63
DUKE L.J. 1091 (2014).
See, e.g., Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74 (1927) (noting how jurisdiction of
federal courts is limited to “protection and enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or
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In a strikingly prescient 1936 article, Borchard traced the case-orcontroversy problems that threatened declaratory judgment proceedings to
the Court’s Muskrat decision:
This unfortunate case started a train of thought in the court directed toward
great conservatism in adjudicating cases, and resulted in a narrow
construction of the terms “cases” or “controversies.” This was an incident of
the increasing reluctance of the court to pass on constitutional questions . . . .
The strict rules evolved in the court for the adjudication of constitutional
questions were imperceptibly deemed to apply to all legal issues and have
been so applied by state courts, thus narrowing unduly the judicial function
as compared with the practice in other countries. Moreover, the various
objections to adjudication, such as prematurity or mootness, inadequacy of
party interest or inconclusiveness of the judgment were all read into the
words “cases” or “controversies,” thus overburdening those words with a
bulging content making them ever more technical without necessarily
dissipating their ambiguity. Most of the tests of justiciability were thus largely
identified with the phrase “cases and controversies” so that the broad
definitions of [the nineteenth century] are now almost unrecognizable. Apart
from the traditional grounds for refusing to review administrative findings,
to pass on political questions, or decide abstract, hypothetical, fictitious, nonadversary or moot cases, cases have in recent years been dismissed on the
ground that the plaintiff’s interest was inadequate or that the issue was not
sufficiently concrete to justify adjudication.34

Borchard thus identified two problems: the perception that the casecontroversy language of Article III had been assigned “a bulging content”
and the view that doctrines, developed as tools to manage constitutional
litigation, had evolved into across-the-board restrictions that unduly narrow
the judicial function in less fraught matters. 35
These threats to the declaratory judgment were put to rest in the 1930s.
In Nashville, Chattanooga Railway v. Wallace, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the non-coercive nature of declaratory relief deprived the
federal courts of power to adjudicate in such matters.36 Citing such varying

34
35

36

punishment of wrongs” when necessary to carry “into effect a judgment between the parties, and
does not extend to the determination of abstract questions or issues framed for the purpose of
invoking the advice of the court”). The coercive force of a judgment for damages, by providing a
lawful basis for a sheriff’s sale of the debtor’s property, explains why parties might settle in the wake
of a judgment. But the settlement does not deprive the judgment of its coercive threat.
Edwin Borchard, Justiciability, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1936).
Much the same thing has occurred with the use of case-or-controversy language to question the
viability of forms of non-contentious or uncontested adjudication in the federal courts. See generally
JAMES E. PFANDER, CASES WITHOUT CONTROVERSIES: UNCONTESTED ADJUDICATION IN
ARTICLE III COURTS (2021).
See Chattanooga, N. & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 263 (1933) (noting that “[w]hile the
ordinary course of judicial procedure results in a judgment requiring an award of process or
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exercises of judicial power as the decree settling borders between states, the
issuance of a naturalization decree, and the quiet title action, the Court
recognized that adjudication did not invariably require coercion.37 Similarly,
in Aetna Life v. Haworth, the Court confirmed the constitutionality of the
federal Declaratory Judgment Act, reversing a lower court opinion that had
viewed such proceedings as incompatible with Article III.38 Borchard had a
hand in both cases, submitting with Charles Clark an amicus brief in Wallace
and publishing a law review article in defense of the act’s constitutionality as
the Haworth case worked its way up to the Supreme Court.39
In fending off constitutional challenges to the declaratory judgment
proceeding, Borchard was working within the doctrinal and rhetorical
framework of the law. Much of his work was directed to legislatures, as he
lobbied for the adoption of enabling acts that would authorize state and
federal courts to entertain declaratory judgment proceedings.40 But much
was also directed to the courts themselves, as he patiently showed how the
declaratory judgment action fit within the tradition of Anglo-American
adjudication.41 Many recognized the power of Borchard’s intellect and
learning and remarked on the impact it had on the evolution of the law.42
His 1941 treatise on the declaratory judgment stands as a monument to the
power of legal scholarship to create and then organize a new field of law.

37
38

39

40
41

42

execution to carry it into effect, such relief is not an indispensable adjunct to the exercise of the
judicial function.”).
Id. at 263–64.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 (1937). Brandeis silently concurred in Haworth,
despite the fact that the decision effectively overturned his attempt to invalidate the declaratory
judgment in Willing.
See Nashville, C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 258 (1933) (identifying amici); Borchard,
supra note 34, at 4–5 (noting how “[t]he growing policy of the Supreme Court—evolved out of its
own consciousness under the leadership of certain judges—designed to keep cases out of the court,
synchronizes with and perhaps explains the narrowness of view evidenced in creating and
developing the criteria of justiciability.”).
On Borchard’s authorship of the uniform state law and the federal declaratory judgment act, see
supra note 15.
On Borchard’s advocacy for the constitutionality of the declaratory judgment, both through articles
and amicus briefs, see supra note 39; see also DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 150–
203, for an examination of the constitutional arguments for and against declaratory judgments as
they informed both state and federal decisional law.
William O. Douglas, Borchard’s colleague at Yale, described Borchard as a “one-man lobby” in
support of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST,
YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 167 (1974).
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II. THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Hazard recognized the value of historically-informed procedure
scholarship and understood that it would often support law reform efforts (as
it had in Borchard’s case). But Hazard also identified forms of empirical
scholarship, which he defined as scholarship focused on the behavior of those
concerned with the law (other than on the formulation and criticism of legal
rules).43 Hazard saw real value in the work of sociologists, keen as that
profession has been on the use of field work to better understand law in
action.44 Hazard also saw value in the work of historians and economists,45
although he did not necessarily anticipate the law-and-economics boom of
the 1960s and 1970s. He had little use for the work of experimental
psychologists, viewing their methods as too ill-formed to contribute reliable
insights into human behavior. 46
Hazard also recognized that empirical or at least non-doctrinal work was
often fueled by a post-realist perspective on legal doctrine.47 In contrast to
the formalists that preceded them, realists held that legal doctrine was the
product of judicial lawmaking and, lacking any independent or determinate
content, was better adapted to justifying a result than to explaining the factors
that informed the decision.48 Hazard described the implications of realism
for the project of legal scholarship this way:
To overstate the case for the purposes of emphasis, I think university legal
researchers may have abandoned the exercise of the skills in doctrinal
research in which they have been trained and at which they are expert in
favor of adventures in non-technical methods, such as philosophical or
psychological reflection, at which they are in varying degrees amateurs. I
think this may be attributable to an uncritical adoption of the premises of

43

44
45
46
47
48

See HAZARD, supra note 6, at 98 (discussing how ‘“[e]mpirical research’” is therefore used here in a
loose sense, to refer to inquiries directed largely or primarily at the behavior, including intellectual
behavior, of people concerned with law other than the formulation, analysis and criticism of legal
rules as such.”).
See id. at 101–02 (noting how “sociologists would be able to contribute much to empirical study of
the adjudicative process.”).
See id. at 105–06 (observing that “[t]he place for economists of this type in the study of the
adjudicative process . . .is a limited but fundamental one.”).
See id. at 103–05 (discussing how “at the present time the experimental psychologists cannot make
significant contributions to the study of the adjudicative process.”).
See id. at 57 (describing the post-realist flight from legal doctrine).
For an account of realism, emphasizing the indeterminacy thesis and the distinction between the
nominal and real rules that govern disputes, see Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 749 (2013).
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“legal realism” without adoption also of the obligation to be “realistic” in a
systematic and disciplined sense.49

Three ideas animate Hazard’s comment: that law professors tend to
enjoy a comparative advantage in doctrinal work; that legal realism has led
them to distrust doctrine as a subject of inquiry; and that they have often
turned, as amateurs, to other disciplines for insights into law. These ideas
were tested at Northwestern Law School under the leadership of David Van
Zandt.
A. EMPIRICS AT NORTHWESTERN
Hazard’s view that realism might discourage doctrinal work provides an
ideal introduction to the disciplinary turn taken at Northwestern Law School
during Van Zandt’s deanship. Serving as Dean from 1995–2011, one of the
longest tenures at a major law school in recent decades, Van Zandt sought
to encourage discipline-based, peer-reviewed scholarship on the part of the
research faculty.50 Van Zandt himself had a Ph.D in sociology based on field
work with a religious group, the Children of God. But he was also trained as
a lawyer, clerked with Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, and
practiced corporate law before joining the Northwestern faculty.51 Van
Zandt was skeptical of doctrinal scholarship and of the wisdom of hiring
traditional legal scholars.52 Instead, Van Zandt prioritized the hiring of
faculty members with PhDs, often those trained to conduct statistical analyses
of one kind or another. Glossing Hazard, Van Zandt held that law faculty
should conduct rigorous discipline-based, rather than amateurship, empirical
work, outside the tradition of doctrinal scholarship.53 He based this approach
on an assessment of comparative advantage.54 The practicing bar could
produce the law books and treatises that were once the province of law school
doctrinalists and other university departments could deploy social scientific
49

50

51
52
53
54

HAZARD, supra note 6, at 57. For something similar, see Posner, supra note 5, at 777 (noting how
“many legal scholars who today are breathing the heady fumes of deconstruction, structuralism,
moral philosophy, and the theory of the second best would be better employed studying the origins
of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine or synthesizing the law of insurance.”).
See, e.g., David E. Van Zandt, The Northwestern Law Approach to Strategic Planning, 31 U. TOL. L. REV.
761, 768 (2000) (describing the Northwestern plan to emphasize interdisciplinary and empirical
research).
For this summary of Van Zandt’s career, see AALS DIRECTORY 1994–95 at 904.
For a statement of his thinking, see David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC.
332 (2003).
See id. at 335 (discussing discipline-based law faculty).
See id. at 332–34 (highlighting the comparative advantage of law faculty “over both practicing
lawyers and academics in other departments”).
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tools, but only legal scholars could deploy those tools to solve problems in the
law.55
In addition to hiring practices, Van Zandt took other steps to encourage
discipline-based research in law. Van Zandt pegged the teaching obligations
of the research faculty at eight student contact hours per year, one of the
lowest in the country.56 Van Zandt’s idea was to shift teaching duties to nontenured professors of practice, reserving time for the tenured faculty to
write.57 He had little use for such traditional forms of legal scholarship as
treatises and casebooks, preferring instead to encourage the publication of
monographs through academic presses.58 He encouraged members of the
research faculty to compile citation counts as part of their annual reports on
their productivity.59 He cultivated close ties to the American Bar Foundation,
which has long been housed in the Rubloff building on the law school’s
Chicago campus. Curiously, he came to view law libraries as dispensable and
saw no reason to hire trained professionals to run the library. Van Zandt saw
these moves as disruptive in a good, Silicon Valley sort of way.60
Van Zandt was quite keen to improve the national standing of the school
and attended with some care to the annual U.S. News rankings. According
to a compilation prepared by the law library at Stanford, these rankings
placed Northwestern in the so-called T14 throughout Van Zandt’s tenure
but did not reflect much movement.61

55
56
57
58
59
60

61

See id. at 333.
In contrast to the eight-hour expectation at Northwestern, faculty at Harvard Law typically teach
ten hours per year.
See id. at 335 (discussing the role of “research faculty of the future law school”).
See id. at 332, 333, 339 (advocating “university press monographs” and noting how the world has
changed such that the legal treatise is no longer the “ultimate product”).
Based on recollection of the author, as a member of Northwestern law faculty.
Van Zandt presided over the departure of leading figures in fields dominated by doctrinal
scholarship. A partial list would include Tom Merrill (public law to Columbia), Rob Sitkoff (trusts
and estates to Harvard), and Henry Smith (equity and property to Harvard).
See Paul Lomio, Erika V. Wayne, & George D. Wilson, Ranking of Top Law Schools 1987 - 2009 US
News & World Report, Robert Crown Law Library Research Paper No. 20 (April 2008).
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FIGURE 1: NORTHWESTERN LAW RANKINGS

As the chart reflects, Van Zandt began and ended his career as dean of a
school ranked 11 in U.S. News. Some movement up and down occurred over
the intervening years, but nothing dramatic or sustained.
In assessing Van Zandt’s strategic embrace of interdisciplinary and
especially quantitative empirical legal scholarship,62 one might ask how
effective he was in hiring new scholars with disciplinary training. According
to a recent summary of faculty hiring during the relevant period compiled
by Northwestern’s (now newly professionalized) library staff, fifteen of the
twenty-one new research faculty members added during Van Zandt’s
deanship would hold Ph.Ds (either at the time of hiring or sometime
thereafter).63 Three of these fifteen new discipline-based scholars had only
Ph.Ds, having never earned a juris doctorate or equivalent degree from a
law school in the United States or elsewhere.64

62

63
64

Here, it may be useful to distinguish quantitative and qualitative empirical work. A variety of law
professors conduct qualitative empirical work, understood as work that rests on observation or
experience, rather than theory or logic. Law progresses when it identifies better ways to test the
validity and reliability of empirical conclusions that may have once depended entirely on qualitative
or experiential observations. For progress in the field of evidence after Daubert’s insistence on greater
scientific rigor, see Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence After Daubert, 1 ANN. REV.
L. SOC. SCI. 105 (2005). DNA exonerations teach us that eyewitness testimony has been notoriously
problematic.
See Faculty Hiring During the Van Zandt Years (compiled by the Pritzker Legal Research Center)
(December 2020) (copy on file with author).
See id.
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Law school rankings will almost surely continue to emphasize citation
counts as one measure of faculty excellence and reputation.65 Brian
Leiter’s rankings, also citation based, have been updated by Greg Sisk and
others.66 These rankings evaluate the strength of the school by ignoring
many U.S. News factors, such as student quality, and concentrating on
citations as a measure of faculty quality.67 Many debate the validity of
citation counts, and I harbor serious doubts about their use.68 One might
nonetheless ask, given his emphasis on citation counts in evaluating the
strength of current and prospective faculty members, whether Van Zandt’s
hiring of a discipline-based faculty bore fruit in terms of his own preferred
metric of citation counts.
Sisk’s methodology, following Leiter, ranks schools by looking at the
citation counts of the average and median members of a faculty.69 Sisk also
identifies the most cited members of the faculty. For Northwestern in 2018,
the year of the most recent survey, Sisk identified eleven members.70 Of those
faculty members, six work primarily in public law applying traditional legal
methods, including one member who has a Ph.D. in political science.71 Of
the remaining five, one does a good deal of empirical work in the allied health
area (albeit without formal disciplinary training in the field), one conducts
some empirical research in patent law (again, without disciplinary training),
one works primarily in environmental and property law, and one works

65

66
67
68

69

70
71

It has been reported that U.S. News & World Report will begin publishing a scholarly impact
ranking. Paul Caron, U.S. News to Publish Law Faculty Scholarly Impact Ranking in 2021 (Nov.
9, 2020), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2020/11/us-news-to-publish-law-facultyscholarly-impact-ranking-in-2021.html. But other reports indicate that U.S. News has decided that
no reliable faculty citation count yet exists.
Gregory Sisk, Nicole Catlin, Katherine Veenis & Nicole Zeman, Scholarly Impact of Law School Faculties
in 2018: Updating the Leiter Score Ranking for the Top Third, 15 ST. THOMAS L.J. 95 (2018).
Id. at 95 (discussing law school rankings based only upon “scholarly impact of law faculties”).
See Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 117,
121–22 (2013) (explaining the problems with citation-based assessments of quality). Justice
Kennedy’s decision in Iqbal, for all its citations by lower court judges and scholars, stands as an
exercise in willful mediocrity. One might nonetheless defend citation counts as a rough measure of
scholarly impact that serve to counter idiosyncratic assessments of quality in the hiring, promotion,
and tenure processes.
For an account of the methodology, see Sisk, supra note 66, at 108–09. For an assessment of citation
counts more generally, see Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Measuring Scholarly Impact: A Guide for Law School
Administrators and Scholars, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 170 (2017).
See Sisk et al., supra note 66, at 119 (identifying Allen, Black, Calabresi, Dana, Diamond,
Koppelman, McGinnis, Pfander, Redish, Rodriguez, and Schwartz).
Curriculum vitae of all eleven professors can be accessed through the Northwestern faculty web page.
Faculty & Research, NW. PRITZKER SCH. OF L., https://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/research.
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primarily within the disciplinary framework of psychology. Neither of the
two most highly cited faculty members has a Ph.D.72
Another citation-based measure of recognition appears in Leiter’s
specialty rankings, which attempt to identify the most highly cited scholars
across a range of legal subjects.73 In the most recent such compilation,
drawing on Sisk’s data from 2018, Leiter compiled specialty rankings in
fourteen separate fields for the period 2013-17.74 Northwestern placed
scholars on the list of top scholars in three fields: constitutional law,75
corporate law,76 and civil procedure.77 None of the ranked scholars has a
Ph.D. in a relevant field, although one works primarily with statistical
methods.78 Notably, Northwestern had no ranked scholars in the fields in
which one finds that Ph.Ds perform particularly well—law and economics,
law and social science, and legal history.
The citation counts of discipline-based scholars may reflect their relative
youth and the tendency of law review citation counts to slight their peerreviewed work.79 Citations counts may also reflect the possibility that scholars
conducting some forms of quantitative empirical research pay too little
attention to the need for a research design that will yield results with relevant
72
73

74

75

76

77

78
79

Both were, though, relatively senior with many publications to which other scholars might cite.
Brian Leiter, Ten Most-Cited Law Faculty in the United States for the period 2013-2017 (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2018/08/ten-most-cited-law-faculty-in-the-united-states-forthe-period-2013-2017.html. This ranking is based on the data compiled by Sisk et al., supra note 66.
For a summary of Leiter’s results, see id. The fields include the following: constitutional law,
corporate and securities law, public law, criminal law and procedure, commercial law, law and
economics, law and social science, legal history, tax, law and philosophy, intellectual property,
international law, and tort/insurance law. Northwestern had ranked scholars in three of these fields,
corporate law, constitutional law, and civil procedure.
Brian Leiter, 20 Most-Cited Constitutional Law Scholars in the U.S. for the Period 2013–2017 (Aug. 21,
2018),
https://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2018/08/20-most-cited-constitutional-lawscholars-in-the-us-for-the-period-2013-2017.html.
Brian Leiter, 20 Most-Cited Corporate Law and Securities Regulation Scholars in the U.S. for the Period 2013–
2017 (Aug. 15, 2018), https://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2018/08/20-most-citedcorporate-law-and-securities-regulation-scholars-in-the-us-for-the-period-2013-2017.html.
Brian Leiter, 10 Most-Cited Civil Procedure Faculty in the U.S. for the Period 2013–2017 (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2018/09/10-most-cited-civil-procedure-faculty-inthe-us-for-the-period-2013-2017.html.
See e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV.
542 (1990).
One might speculate that law professors often conduct scholarly research in the most readily
available source, Westlaw. If so, then citations will skew toward journals that appear in Westlaw’s
collection. But Westlaw excludes many social science journals, thereby failing to make them readily
available to professors looking for scholarship on a particular topic. Thanks to Greg Sisk for
suggesting this explanation. One might test the impact of reliance on Westlaw by comparing
citation counts in Google Scholar, which does include many social science journals. See Lucas, supra
note 69, at 172 (noting that Google Scholar includes citation in social science journals).
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normative implications. Professor Joshua Fischman put his finger on this
problem in an engaging reflection on the failure of much empirical work to
adopt a normatively interesting research design:
When standards for research questions are left unarticulated, it is all too
tempting to allow the availability of data to define the research question.
Without some criterion of importance, one can start with a data set, apply a
preferred statistical technique, and then rationalize a research question that
is answered by the resulting estimate.80

Pre-commitment can address the problem of p-trolling81 but will not
ensure that researchers pose normatively useful questions. Some scholars
may view the exploration of causal relationships as a worthwhile research
project, declining to heed Fischman’s call for research designs that might help
improve the normative bite of quantitative work.
What then accounts for Van Zandt’s emphasis on discipline-based
scholarship? Gains in citation counts and school prestige proven elusive. As
one thoughtful reader observed, Van Zandt could have scored more
citations by doing more hiring in the fields of public law and public health,
fields that tend to attract a good deal of citation attention.82 Rather than
citation-chasing, Van Zandt’s practice of hiring empirical Ph.Ds appears to
have been driven by a distinctive view of what constitutes good legal
scholarship.83 All of which leads us back to the account with which we
began: deeply skeptical realists distrust legal doctrine, even in the hands of
such luminaries as Edwin Borchard.
80

81

82

83

Fischman, supra note 68 at 160. Christopher Columbus Langdell opposed the suggested linkage
between doctrinal work and normative considerations and sought to focus entirely on doctrine. See
Patrick J. Kelly, Holmes, Langdell, and Formalism, 15 RATIO JURIS 26, 36 (2002) (quoting letter from
Langdell to Theodore Dwight Woolsey of Yale, drawing a line between the study of law as it is and
the study of law as it ought to be and concluding that lawyers and law professors ought to study
only the law as it is.).
To reduce the likelihood of data manipulation, scholars have called for a pre-commitment to
specific research questions in advance of any data collection and regression analysis. Otherwise,
researchers may find it too tempting to ask the questions that a regression on available data happens
to answer, leading to replicability problems. See Robert MacCoun & Saul Perlmutter, Hide Results
to Seek the Truth, 526 NATURE 187, 188 (2015) (calling attention to the replicability crisis and the
need for blind research methods); Robert J. MacCoun, The Epistemic Contract: Fostering an Appropriate
Level of Trust in Experts 28 (Working Paper, No. 2524585, 2014) (discussing the push for transparent
research as a way to build an appropriate level of public trust in experts).
For an interesting compilation and analysis of which law review articles garner the most cites, see
Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV.
1483 (2012) (updating lists on the most cited law review articles and analyzing trends in legal
thought).
Notably, even so adept a social scientist as Richard Posner repeatedly called for greater attention
to legal doctrine and lamented the failure of law professors to conduct such analysis at a suitably
high level. Posner, supra note 5, at 777.
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B. Empirics and Procedure
For many years, scholarship in the field of procedure has focused on
internal forms of argument, much like those Edwin Borchard made in
defense of the declaratory judgment within the discursive tradition of legal
argument.84 One can see the dominance of traditional legal methods among
proceduralists in a variety of sources. Hazard praised the Hart and Wechsler
casebook, Federal Courts and the Federal System, as a truly innovative and
high-quality example of legal scholarship in procedure.85 Although the book
first appeared in 1953, a few years before Hazard wrote, Hart and Wechsler
has retained its hold on legal academia and continues to influence
scholarship and law reform efforts in the subjects it tackles.86 The book tends
to anchor historically-inflected doctrinally-focused writing that frustrates
scholars with a more explicitly policy-based or critical approach to legal
scholarship.87 Mark Tushnet, for example, expressed frustration after
attending a junior scholars’ conference that work in federal jurisdiction
remained too narrowly doctrinal and historical.88
Several factors have tended to encourage traditional doctrinal
scholarship among proceduralists. For starters, many of the new faculty hired
to teach and write in procedure have had some experience in law practice.89
In addition, procedure scholars tend to teach first-year classes in which a
focus on doctrine comes naturally. The practice background and
instructional obligations of procedure scholars may help explain why, as
Hazard observed, their scholarly work often resembles law office
memoranda.90 Perhaps equally important, courts and practitioners may tend
to view questions of procedure as more clearly based on the rules that emerge
from standard legal analysis than those in fields where normative
considerations play a more substantial role. Justice Elena Kagan seemingly
had this distinction in mind when, as a part of public comments to a faculty
84
85
86

87
88
89
90

See generally DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, supra note 17.
See HAZARD, supra note 6, at 1277 n. 121 (discussing HENRY M. HART JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953)).
As one author put it, “[n]o law book has enjoyed greater acclaim from distinguished commentators
over a sustained period than has Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System.
Indeed, the praise seems to escalate from one edition to the next.” Michael Wells, Who’s Afraid of
Henry Hart?, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 175, 175 (1997).
See generally id. at 176. (criticizing Hart & Wexler for failing to consider a policy-based approach).
Mark Tushnet, The Federal Courts Junior Scholars Workshop (Oct. 2014), https://jotwell.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/ConLaw_Fed-Courts-Scholars-Workshop_Oct2014.pdf.
See e.g., Faculty Hiring, supra note 63.
See HAZARD, supra note 6, at 58 (describing much legal scholarship as law office on academic
letterhead).
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group, she described the Supreme Court’s deliberative process.91 On the
most divisive questions of constitutional law, on which the Justices have well
developed views, deliberations do not help.92 But as to what one might
consider the more lawyerly questions, particularly on issues of jurisdiction,
Justice Kagan described a vigorous and helpful deliberative process as the
Justices strove for right lawyerly answers.93
Justice Kagan’s account of the deliberative process nicely maps onto the
results of an interesting study of the comparative power of two competing
models for predicting Supreme Court outcomes. In a contest between the
“machine” (predictions based on Martin-Quinn scores that ignore doctrine
and measure the ideology of the Justices and array them along a spectrum)
and the “experts” (a group of academics and appellate practitioners with
knowledge of the Court’s doctrine and workways), the machine generally
won.94 But the experts “substantially outperformed the model in predicting
both case outcomes and votes in the judicial power cases.”95 The cases in
this category presented “technical issues of procedure in which the rule of
decision was unlikely to directly implicate broad policy debates outside the
legal system.”96 In such situations, the authors found, legal experts may
have a “comparative advantage over the machine.”97 Put simply, legal
doctrine may have greater predictive and holding power in procedure cases
than in the more ideologically-charged issues of constitutional law that
come before the federal courts.
Theory may have something to say about why doctrine plays a more
substantial role in matters of procedure, and perhaps in public law, than in
other more evidently policy-laden fields. Procedure and some aspects of
public law ultimately center on the idea that an impersonal rule of law
provides the framework within which parties resolve their disputes. Rule-oflaw values—notice, an opportunity to be heard, equality of arms in litigation,

91

92
93
94

95
96
97

For an account of Justice Kagan’s remarks, see John O. McGinnis, Our Two Supreme Courts (May
2015), https://lawliberty.org/our-two-supreme-courts (recounting Justice Kagan’s speech at
Northwestern Law School.).
See id. (arguing that further deliberation is unhelpful where there is a lack of “common legal
language” or even “shared preferences” on the Court.).
Id.
See Theodore C. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court
Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004) (finding that a statistical model better forecasted the Supreme Court’s
decisions as compared to predictions made by legal experts).
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Id.
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an unbiased judge—have long informed our understanding of the role that
an independent judiciary should play in our scheme of government.98
Arguments about how to reconfigure the balance of power, between plaintiffs
and defendants or between state and federal tribunals, may yield more
readily to the discursive tradition of law than to the more utilitarian policy
analysis that informs choices in, say, corporate law. Even in fields adjacent
to public law, like the partisan gerrymandering case that spawned Chief
Justice Roberts’ critique of social scientific data, the strong pull of the rule of
law may tend to crowd out the contributions of empiricists.99 One might
predict, then, that law-and-economics and other social scientific learning will
contribute more to policy debates about the perfection of market-based
transactions than to arguments about what it means to have a just system of
adjudication or a good society.
If the impersonal rule-of-law underpinning of procedure makes doctrine
more salient than in other fields of law—where policy debates, partisan
perspectives, and motivated reasoning may shape judicial decisions100—then
empirical scholarship in procedure might best be grounded in a strong
command of doctrine, and the distinctive normative issues it presents. That,
indeed, was part of the message Professor Fischman conveyed in reflecting
on the failure of much empirical work to grapple effectively with normative

98

99
100

On the importance of impartial administration of justice, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833) (“Without justice being freely, fully, and
impartially administered, neither our persons, nor our rights, nor our property, can be protected.
And if these, or either of them, are regulated by no certain laws, and are subject to no certain
principles, and are held by no certain tenure, and are redressed, when violated, by no certain
remedies, society fails of all its value; and men may as well return to a state of savage and barbarous
independence.”). For a classic definition of due process, see Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279–95 (1975) (identifying as elements of due process: an unbiased
tribunal; notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it; opportunity to present
reasons why the proposed action should not be taken; the right to present evidence, including the
right to call witnesses; the right to know opposing evidence; the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses; a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented; opportunity to be represented by
counsel; requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented; requirement that
the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons for its decision; public attendance; and
judicial review).
See Gill v. Whitford 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018) (criticizing data on partisan gerrymandering for
failing to account for the practical effect of such gerrymandering on individuals’ rights.).
On the role of motivated reasoning, see Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and
Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (“Motivated reasoning refers to
the tendency of people to unconsciously process information—including empirical data, oral and
written arguments, and even their own brute sensory perceptions—to promote goals or interests
extrinsic to the decisionmaking task at hand.”).
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issues.101 And, sure enough, the best of the new empirical procedural
scholarship, very much including Steve Burbank’s work with Sean Farhang,
tackles procedural problems from a perspective informed by an exceptional
command of doctrinal nuance and institutional role.102 As a model for the
future, Burbank and Farhang, and a host of younger scholars, have much to
teach us about how we might use more sophisticated empirics to shed light
on the complex normative issues that procedural doctrine generates.
III. THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL PROCEDURE SCHOLARSHIP
In the work of Burbank and Farhang, we find some of the most promising
empirically minded contributions to our understanding of the institutions
that make and alter the adjective law of the federal courts.103 Burbank has,
of course, long been our most penetrating observer of the rule-making
process, recognizing in a classic paper that limits on procedural
encroachments on substantive law were meant to protect federal legislative
primacy in that sphere.104 More recent papers continue to explore the
institutional role of courts and legislative bodies, combining the deep
understanding that one gains from a patient lifetime of study with the use of
more muscular empirical tools to test intuitions about the partisan character
of procedural innovation.105 If as Burbank and Farhang explain, “[e]mpirical
study is a threat to ignorance and thus to claims of neutrality,”106 then the

101

102

103
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See Fischman, supra note 68 at 156–58 (writing that an “essential feature of law . . . is its normativity”
and explaining that the importance of empirical research on the law must be assessed in terms of
the values it references and promotes.).
See e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Class Certification in the U.S. Court of
Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. 231 (2020) (analyzing how characteristics of appellate judges influence
class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1543, 1544 (2014) (detailing how the courts through their control of procedure affect private
enforcement of individual rights.).
See Burbank, supra note 10. Apart from his scholarship, Burbank has devoted no small amount of
time to the unsung work of painstaking law reform. Burbank led a Third Circuit Task Force on the
subject of Rule 11 sanctions and contributed his findings to a growing body of empirical work that
questioned the wisdom of the 1983 amendments to the Rule. In addition, Burbank led a group of
procedure scholars in a careful evaluation of the proposed restyling of the Federal Rules,
coordinating efforts to comb carefully through the draft in search of mis-steps.
A repository of Burbank’s published works can be accessed through the Penn Law Legal
Scholarship Repository. Stephen Burbank, PENN L. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/do/search/?q=author_lname%3A%22Burbank%22%20AN
D%20author_fname%3A%22Stephen%22&start=0&context=3571832&sort=date_desc&facet=.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 103, at 1597.
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empirics on display in this work powerfully reveal partisan politics at work in
the nominally neutral precincts of procedural reform.
A. Burbank and Farhang on the Political Economy of Procedure
Burbank and Farhang work at several levels at once. For starters, they
offer an empirical account of legislative efforts to alter access to court for
plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their rights under federal statutes, many of
which include provisions for the payment of attorneys’ fees.107 Beginning
with the Reagan era, many of these proposals sought to curtail fee payments
or impose other restrictions in response to a supposed litigation
“explosion.”108 But these proposals failed to gain traction, in part due to the
multiple veto points in the legislative process and in part due to the absence
of broad-based popular support.109 Then, Burbank and Farhang chart a
more successful gambit as reformers shifted their attention away from
legislative reform and in the direction of reform through the process of
amending and interpreting procedural rules.110 Early efforts at reform by rule
change (such as the 1983 version of Rule 11) triggered popular opposition
and led to the creation of a more transparent rule-making process,
culminating in the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act.111
But reform was more successful in the Supreme Court, where the Justices
have the capacity to make significant changes, as in the rules that govern
notice pleading, by simple majority vote.112 Burbank and Farhang show that
similar changes have occurred in the interpretation of Rule 23 and in the
restrictive interpretation of fee-shifting statutes.113 They couple this account
with an assessment of the ideology of the Justices who voted for and against
narrowed access to justice.114 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the more ideologically

107
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110
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Id. at 1555–56.
Burbank & Farhang at 1556.
Id. at 1564–65.
See id. at 1587 (“[E]ffective control of procedure ensures that means are available for a judiciary
that is ideologically distant or driven by institutional self-interest to frustrate legislative preferences
by constricting access to court.”).
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 authorizes the Supreme court to promulgate rules of procedure,
the 1988 amendments formalized the committee procedure through which the rules are researched
and proposed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071–2077 (highlighting the Supreme Court’s authorization to
promulgate rules of procedure).
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (making a widely-remarked change from notice to
plausibility pleading by a narrow 5–4 vote).
See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 103, at 1604 (discussing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338 (2011), as a decision that stretched interpretation of Rule 23 to the breaking point).
Id. at 1607.
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conservative Justices were those most likely to support narrowed access to the
federal courts along a range of issues.115
Like the politics of rule amendments, the empirics on display work at
several levels. First, the authors nicely debunk the empirical evidence
marshaled to support access-narrowing amendments to the rules of
procedure.116 Down a long list of issues, from pleading to discovery to
baseless or frivolous litigation, careful study of the actual practice of civil
litigation reveals little empirical support for changes proposed to narrow
access to court.117 Second, the authors draw on impressive large N studies of
the voting behavior of the Justices to cement the claim that ideology informs
the Court’s approach to what they describe as a form of procedural
lawmaking through the interpretive process.118 But they stop short of overclaiming, recognizing at several points along the way that other factors aside
from ideology undoubtedly inform the Justices’ votes.119
To summarize, Burbank and Farhang combine the insights of the
“machine” and the “experts” in a magisterial account of the political
economy of procedural law reform.120 The piece would not have been
possible without a deep knowledge of the field and a close reading of the
interaction of Supreme Court decisional law and the rule-making process.
Nor would the work have conveyed so powerful a message had it relied only
on a narrative account of the law and politics of procedural lawmaking.
Other senior scholars have made the arresting, if largely intuitive or casually
empirical, claim that the Supreme Court has been captured by the Chamber
of Commerce;121 Burbank and Farhang provide compelling proof.
B. The New Procedural Empiricism
One measure of the success of the new procedural empiricism has been
the extent to which it has encouraged a broad group of younger scholars to
take up the empirical study of procedure, particularly with an eye on the
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118
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The justices least likely to vote for greater access were Powell, Thomas, and Scalia. The justices
most likely to vote for expanded access were Kagan, Sotomayor, and Brennan. Id. at 1607.
Id. at 1558–59.
Id.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 103, at 1572–73.
For example, the authors theorize that a decreased threat of legislative override may have played a
role in judicial decision making post-1994. Id. at 1577.
See Ruger, et al., supra note 94 (summarizing Burbank and Farhang’s contributions).
See Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L. REV. 636 (2011)
(expressing agreement with Arthur Miller that the Court’s opinion in J. McIntire Machinery Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 546 U.S. 873 (2011), reflects its capture by the Chamber of Commerce).

December 2021]

PROCEDURAL SCHOLARSHIP

2517

regulatory role of private civil litigation and the politics of the rulemaking
process. Brooke Coleman has looked critically at the membership of the rules
advisory committees, questioning its lack of diversity.122 Zach Clopton has
compiled a remarkable collection of data on the rulemaking process in the
state systems, providing an exhaustive and long overdue account of their
form and function.123 Others, including Diego Zambrano, have adopted less
distinctively empirical strategies, following Burbank and Farhang to reckon
the benefits of private civil discovery as a substitute for more expensive forms
of agency investigation and enforcement.124
The best such procedural scholarship also follows Burbank and Farhang
in combining quantitative and qualitative empirical analysis within a
framework informed by a clear-eyed set of normative questions. Marin
Levy’s work with Adam Chilton on random panel assignments provides a
kind of one-two empirical punch. The first paper examines the fact of the
matter, compiling a dataset of circuit court panel assignments and
questioning the widespread assumption that such assignments had been
randomly made.125 The second paper explores the practice of assignment
through painstaking interviews with circuit judges and senior court
administrators, confirming its non-random character.126 Such work,
informed by knowledge of the institutions of circuit court adjudication, calls
for reconsideration of a large body of quantitative empirical work that takes
random assignment as a given.
While some of these empirical pieces have been written without the
benefit of disciplinary training in statistics, much of the best recent empirical
procedural scholarship displays a nice statistical sophistication. Consider the
work of Jonah Gelbach, who wrestles productively with the changes to
procedure wrought by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
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See Brooke D. Coleman, #SoWhiteMale: Federal Civil Rulemaking, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 407 (2018)
(reporting that 116 out of 136 members appointed to the rules committee over its history have been
white males); cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform:
An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559 (2015) (tracing the politics that inform selection of
members on the rule-making committees of the Judicial Conference).
See Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2018) (compiling data
on the rule making process).
See Diego Zambrano, Discovery as Regulation, 118 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2020) (arguing, via a less
empirical method, the case for private discovery).
See Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015) (compiling evidence of nonrandom
panel assignment in federal appellate courts).
See Marin K. Levy, Panel Assignments in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (2017)
(confirming through interviews a set of non-random assignment practices).
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Iqbal.127 Gelbach sets out to help us better understand the impact of the two
decisions on pleading, motions to dismiss, discovery, and adjudication on the
merits. In doing so, he recognizes that the design of empirical scholarship
must be driven by a sound understanding of normative questions and
account for the complexity of human behavior.128 Thinking hard about
selection effects, Gelbach effectively criticizes much of the no-big-deal
empiricism that emerged post-Twiqbal.129
One might well predict that the procedure scholars of the future will
increasingly enter the job market with advanced degrees in other disciplines.
My colleague at Northwestern, Sarah Lawsky, maintains a database of all
new hires at AALS member schools.130 According to Lawsky, who cautions
that the information she collects depends on self-reporting and may not be
complete, procedure scholars increasingly come to the market with advanced
degrees but not at the rate of the general hiring pool.131 Consider the
following table, collecting data from 2011-2020 and comparing the
background of all newly hired professors with those new hires who list civil
procedure as one of their two top fields of endeavor.
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See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors of Discovery? 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012); Jonah B. Gelbach,
Can the Dark Arts of the Dismal Science Shed Light on the Empirical Reality of Civil Procedure? 2 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LIT. 223 (2014).
See Gelbach, Dark Arts supra note 127, at 292–93 (emphasizing normative bite and human agency
as complicating factors in quantitative empirical analysis).
Id. at 234 (criticizing Hubbard’s failure to take account of defendant-focused selection effects).
Sarah Lawsky, Entry Level Hiring Report, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 11, 2021),
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/entry-level-hiring-report. Lawsky prepared the
tabular comparison at the author’s request. Note that hires in civil procedure are identified not
by willingness to teach as expressed in the registry forms submitted to AALS but by self-reports
of fields of primary scholarly interest as submitted to Lawsky. Note further that new hires in civil
procedure are included in the data for “all doctrinal hires,” thus muddying the comparison to
some extent.
Id.
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FIGURE 2: CREDENTIALS OF FACULTY HIRED BY AALS MEMBER
SCHOOLS 2011–2020

The data reveal that civil procedure scholars, as one might expect, are
more likely to have clerkship experience and less likely to have advanced
degrees, including Ph.Ds than newly hired scholars as a group.132 Yet one
supposes that new hires in procedure over the past decade were substantially
more likely to have advanced degrees and doctorates at the time they were
hired than the incumbent procedure professors they joined or replaced.
I view the disciplinary background of those recently hired in procedure,
coupled with their practice, fellowship, and clerkship experience, as a
particularly hopeful sign of what lies ahead for procedure scholarship.
Command of legal doctrine remains a key element of procedure scholarship,
providing the framework that helps define what counts as important in the
field. Indeed, a continuing concern with getting the doctrine right helps to
explain the popularity of the listserv in civil procedure, where scholars from
around the country pose and parse procedure puzzles. Legal rules and the
rich normative debates they engender will continue to anchor the best
procedure scholarship. Only by understanding the normative discourse of
the law can procedure scholars ask the research questions and design the
studies needed to provide useful answers.
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One might suppose, as Zach Clopton has suggested, that the trend revealed in the table reflects the
advice of senior faculty that job applicants with a background in law practice and no disciplinary
training might best seek their academic fortune as proceduralists.
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C. Integrating Law and Discipline-Based Scholarship
What’s true for scholarship in procedure may well be true for the rest of
the law school. Some versions of a discipline-based model may lead to a law
faculty made up of breakout rooms, where the public lawyers talk to one
another in spaces set off from those occupied by the economists and
historians and political scientists. The multiplicity of discipline-based
workshops at the modern law school provides some evidence of disciplinary
fragmentation.133 Only the most ardent faculty member can attend and
contribute to all of the sessions on offer; most faculty members focus on those
that seem most relevant to their work. One might begin to worry when the
economists at a law school prefer to talk shop with the university’s other
economists (those housed in the business school and the college of arts and
sciences) than with their law school colleagues.
Such fragmentation threatens the coherence of law as a discourse around
which the law faculty can organize its intellectual life. That life has many
elements: members of a law faculty work together to produce new legal
scholarship, they collectively contribute to the improvement of work
presented to them at workshops, they evaluate the scholarship of prospective
new members of the faculty at both hiring and tenure time, they define what
counts as good in legal scholarship by performing peer reviews at the request
of the growing number of law journals that have made such review a part of
the article selection process, they make judgments about quality in awarding
prizes, chairs, and other recognition. Those assessments of quality have real
consequences, both for the sort of scholarship that makes its way into the
nation’s top law reviews and for the kind of work aspiring scholars will
produce as they apply for teaching jobs. Obviously, law faculties can and
should make room for a wide range of disciplinary approaches to legal
problems. But normative discourse about the law continues to provide the
most coherent framework for integrating the many methods that legal
scholars bring to bear on today’s problems.134
133

134

Workshops on legal methods, such as the law-and-economics workshops that have cropped up here
and there, promise one interesting advantage: by bringing together scholarship from a variety of
different substantive fields, they may encourage a return to generalist and cross-cutting analysis of
substantive doctrine.
On the normative character of legal scholarship, see Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes
and Cure, 90 Y ALE L. J. 1205 (1981); see also Edward Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law,
1997 W IS. L. R EV. 521, 522 (1997) (outlining the prescriptive element of legal scholarship);
Edward Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 M ICH. L. R EV. 1835,
1848 (1988) (identifying a “prescriptive voice distinguishes legal scholarship from most other
academic fields”).
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The centrality of normative legal discourse challenges the assumptions of
some discipline-based scholarship, much of which prizes positive accounts
over normative accounts. But many of the disciplinary scholars who come to
legal scholarship find its openly normative character newly invigorating.
Legal scholarship can make a significant contribution to the reform and
improvement of the law, as Borchard’s example underscores. Many
departments in the university look for ways to contribute to society, perhaps
through technology transfer to the private sector. Scholarship in law,
especially where it provides insights into suggested adjustments in legal
doctrine or advocates for legislative change, often leads to a comparable form
of technology transfer. Law professors submit amicus briefs, they testify
before legislative assemblies, and they work with law reform groups such as
the American Law Institute and the National Commission on Uniform State
Laws, all with a view towards influencing the future direction of law.
Empirical scholarship in procedure can make substantial contributions to
the project of keeping the rules of procedure, state and federal, up to date.
Indeed, rule-makers at the federal level have shown a growing appetite for
empirical assessments of various kinds. Empirics underlay the amendments
to Rule 11, establishing a safe harbor in 1993;135 empirics informed the
evaluation of changes to the practice of class actions; and empirics followed
in the wake of Twiqbal as rule-makers weighed the import of those
decisions.136 A host of new studies seek to bring empirical learning to bear on
the allocational decisions that abound in the fields of procedure and
jurisdiction.137
D. The Market for Legal Scholarship
Reflections on the value of legal scholarship lead naturally to some
consideration of the market for legal scholarship. Market-based thinking
leads in turn to questions about what value legal scholarship confers on
society, what justifies the high tuitions that many law students pay to
underwrite the time law professors devote to their scholarship, and who
ultimately pays for legal scholarship. Market-based thinking played a role in
135
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The advisory committee notes accompanying the 1993 amendment opens with a collection of the
empirical work that had been published, examining experience under the 1983 version of Rule 11.
See Advisory Comm. Notes (citing, among other works, the Third Circuit Task Force Report,
prepared under the leadership of Steve Burbank).
On the use of empirical studies in connection with the rule-making process, see Paul D. Carrington,
Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597 (2010).
See David Freeman Engstron, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1203 (2013) (reviewing the explosion of empirical studies following Twiqbal).
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Dean Van Zandt’s preference for faculty scholarship devoted to the
production of monographs rather than treatises.138 Van Zandt apparently
believed that the willingness of the practicing bar to purchase treatises and
other doctrinal material in the market lessened the need for law schools to
support research to produce such materials.139 From Van Zandt’s
perspective, faculty salary increases and research bonuses were unnecessary
to bring treatises to market and the doctrine explored in such works was, in
any case, unworthy of extended scholarly treatment and study.140
Recognizing that faculty members can exploit side markets for their
expertise suggests the need to consider one additional problem. Private
consulting promises a potentially significant source of additional income to
law professors with established reputations in their fields.141 Over time, the
financial allure of private consulting might dampen the enthusiasm of
tenured faculty for the production of new scholarship. I am unaware of any
good study of the number of hours that tenured law professors devote to
consulting work, but universities typically impose caps, taking the view that
such projects may conflict with the faculty’s professorial duties.142 The
market for consulting work might lead some deans to prefer discipline-based
scholars on the theory that their work might attract fewer distracting
opportunities to consult, at least with law firms.
Market substitutes and opportunity cost provided the basis for Judge
Posner’s speculation that the law faculties of the future would comprise a set
of highly-paid doctrinalists and a set of more moderately compensated
discipline-based scholars.143 Posner reasoned that the doctrinalists could
leave academia to secure employment at high-paying law firms.144 So far as
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See Van Zandt, supra note 50 at 333 (asserting that practitioners have a “substantial market interest”
in conducting doctrinal research in specialized areas of law).
Id.
Had the law school captured the value created by the faculty’s production of casebooks and treatises
as works for hire, one might suppose that Van Zandt would have provided greater support for such
scholarship. See Matthew T. Bodie, Funding Legal Scholarship, 4 J. L. PERIODICAL LAB’Y OF LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 107, 113–14 (2014) (noting that though law schools fund the production of textbooks
and treatises through a professor’s salary, the profits from those publications flows directly to the
author rather than the institution).
See generally, Rory K Little, Law Professors as Lawyers: Consultants, of Counsel, and the Ethics of SelfFlagellation, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 345 (2001) (discussing issues surrounding practicing law
professors).
See Id. at 369 (discussing the informal “twenty–percent” rule for outside work).
See Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1129 (1981) (calling
for a substantial increase in the salary paid to doctrinalists).
Id. at 1116–17 (noting that despite the similarity in practice of doctrinal academics and practicing lawyers,
law teacher salaries have remained stagnant while law firm compensation has shot up).
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I can tell, however, this two-tier system of compensation has yet to take hold
in legal academia. Especially at the entry-level, law schools in my experience
tend to make equally valued offers to all new hires on the tenure track,
without regard to the extent of the candidates’ disciplinary training or their
ability to secure alternative employment in a law firm.145 But the market for
consulting income, often paid by private law firms, may offer subtle support
for Posner’s thesis, giving rise to the income gap that Posner predicted.
Leaving aside outside income and focusing on the cost of legal scholarship
and the benefits it confers on society, one might question the devotion of top
law schools to the production of legal knowledge. Law professors devote a
significant portion of their time to scholarship; indeed, when one considers
the compensation paid to law professors, it surely includes the psychic value
gained from the publication of scholarly ideas. Students underwrite the time
spent on scholarship through the payment of tuition increases (made possible
in turn by the market for new lawyers) that show no sign of abating.146 After
all, if professors taught more, law schools could get by with fewer faculty
members and could offer legal education at a more affordable rate. Students
might understandably wonder about their obligation to underwrite an
enterprise that offers them little by way of apparent benefits. While we
university insiders continue to repeat the old adage about the way good
scholarship complements good teaching, evidence to support such claims is
anything but abundant.147 The world of legal academia is full of much
beloved law teachers who contribute little by way of scholarly output.
Yet a number of factors complicate the case for reducing scholarly output
to facilitate increased teaching loads and lessen the cost of legal education.
Law schools compete for scholarly talent in a market. Although teaching
quality plays a role in the assessment of outside talent, most hiring
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To be sure, schools may occasionally hire entry level professors into the rank of associate professor,
justifying a salary increment over those hired as assistant professors. But I do not understand such
practices to reflect disciplinary training. Of course, in some fields of law, such as antitrust and the
calculation of damages, quantitative skills can be especially helpful, as the consulting experience of
the economists associated with Compass Lexicon tends to confirm.
Accounting for inflation, it now costs 2.76 times as much to attend a private law school, and 5.92
times as much to attend a public law school as it did in 1985. LST DATA DASHBOARD,
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/tuition.
See Deborah Merritt, Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical Exploration, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 765, 809 (1998) (finding no significant relationship between teaching excellence and scholarly
distinction).

2524

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

committees pay more attention to the quality of a candidate’s scholarship.148
Schools compete for talent, in turn, to improve their academic stature.149 If
they succeed, they will improve the value of student degrees and attract more
talented students to future classes, confirming a change in institutional
quality. While individual faculty members profit from the competition for
academic talent, the market remains at least somewhat impersonal; faculty
do not simply vote themselves raises in the same breath that they approve
tuition increases. Instead, deans typically make both these decisions.
In an engaging study of who pays for and benefits from legal scholarship,
Ed Rubin pointed out that students do not bear the cost of legal scholarship,
at least in the final analysis.150 Most students borrow money to finance their
legal education and repay their loans either through federal loan forgiveness
(assuming they take public interest jobs) or through law firm salaries.151
Graduates of more prestigious national law schools draw relatively generous
salaries, at least initially.152 Law school prestige, in turn, both helps to ensure
and may to some extent depend on the quality of a law faculty’s
scholarship.153 Scholarship can confer benefits on students and graduates by
maintaining or improving the perceived prestige of their alma mater and
the value of their degrees. (Hence the understandable concern of alums with
changes and especially declines in a school’s ranking.) But the ultimate cost
of legal scholarship may be underwritten by employers of new legal talent,
including law firms, who pay the salary premiums that allow schools to raise
tuition and support faculty scholarship. The ultimate incidence of
educational costs (and scholarship costs) may fall on law firm clients and
others who benefit from the work of new lawyers. Rubin concluded that, in
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See Daniel Gordon, Hiring Law Professors: Breaking the Back of an American Plutocratic Oligarchy, 19
WIDENER L.J. 137 (2009) (describing the hiring process of law professors as one that is comically ill
suited to identifying the most effective teachers).
A significant portion of the U.S. News and World rankings is based on a peer assessment score
which will invariably reflect the quality of scholarship produced by faculty. See Robert Morse et al.,
Methodology: 2021 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 16, 2020)
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/law-schools-methodology.
Edward Rubin, Should Law Schools Support Faculty Research?, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 139
(2008).
Nearly three-quarters (74.1%) of law students graduate in debt, with an average graduating debt of
$160,000. Mel Hanson, Average Law School Debt, EDUCATIONDATA.ORG (Aug. 9, 2020),
https://educationdata.org/average-law-school-debt.
Typical graduates of T14 schools earn between $105,000 and $180,300 in their first year of
employment. Mike Stetz,What Law Grads Earn, 29 NAT’L JURIST, Spring 2020 at 16.
See Morse, supra note 149.
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this somewhat indirect way, the consumers of legal services tend to pay for
the production of legal scholarship.154
In any case, law schools can probably best be seen as more broadly
responsible for the production and dissemination of knowledge, rather than
more narrowly focused on the production of recent law graduates. So
understood, the law school mission naturally privileges scholarly
engagement. Students at national schools benefit from their exposure to
leading scholars in their respective fields; such exposure better prepares them
for the nuanced and highly complex problems they will likely confront in
practice. In that sense, the scholarly and pedagogical missions of elite schools
complement one another far better than a tuition-based critique of legal
scholarship might allow. One might ask whether all law schools should
provide the teaching relief that would enable their faculty to conduct
research in the same proportions as their colleagues at national schools, but
one cannot really doubt the centrality of legal scholarship.
If we see a disruption of the established model of teaching and scholarship
in the modern law school, it will likely come from outside the ranks of the
current T14. But post-pandemic upstarts, offering souped up versions of the
zoom classes that many law schools rolled out in March 2020, might provide
just such a challenge. It seems quite possible to imagine a low-cost, on-line
alternative to traditional legal education that would connect proven law
teachers with those willing to take law schools classes through computer
screens, forgoing in exchange for reduced tuition the in-person experiences
that many have seen as crucial to the past century’s conception of legal
education. Yet to secure accreditation and acceptance by employers, such a
school would necessarily work to attract highly visible legal educators –
sending a signal of quality that would attract high quality students and allay
concerns with the academic rigor of the on-line program. (The University of
California—Irvine adopted such a strategy when it entered the market for
legal education.) Such marquee professors would presumably demand fairly
generous salary and benefits (or perhaps stock options to buy shares in a forprofit start-up) as well as opportunities to research and publish. The new online school might economize on the costs of bricks, mortar, campus upkeep,
and library books, but would still confront significant personnel costs.
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See Rubin, supra note 150, at 151–53 (concluding that cost of legal scholarship properly falls on
those who provide legal services and pay tuitions of recent law graduates).
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CONCLUSION
Legal scholarship in general, like that in procedure, comes in many
shapes and sizes. As Hazard explained, scholars use history, philosophy,
legal theory, and empirical tools of various kinds to inform their work. One
can approach legal problems from the inside, through the doctrinal and lawreform lenses of an Edwin Borchard, and from the outside, by using
empirical tools to consider the impact of law in action. The best scholarship
will do both, combining doctrinal sophistication with a recognition that
doctrine frames but does not answer most of the questions that matter today.
Burbank and Farhang demonstrate the power of interdisciplinary work that
begins with a consummate command of legal doctrine and the normative
issues it presents and then interrogates those issues with patient and wellconstructed empirics.
Legal scholarship will grow more empirically sophisticated over time, as
disciplinary training provides an entry point for criticism of slipshod
methods. I suspect that the best such scholarship will combine the doctrinal
nuance on display in Burbank and Farhang with an increasingly powerful set
of empirical tools (not all quantitative). One might predict that some of the
best such work may take place in the field of procedure, where the scholarly
community continues to reward a strong command of the law’s technical
language and doctrinal wrinkles. By demanding such doctrinal command as
the price of doing business in the field, procedure may tend to discourage
empiricists from entering the field to conduct the unthinking regression
analyses that Fischman rightly criticized. Only scholars who have a strong
command of the language and nuance of the law, in books and in
courtrooms, will be drawn to and make headway in the field. Doctrinal
sophistication cannot alone ensure that scholars will pose interesting
normative questions, but an insistent demand for prescriptive implications
may help.
In the end, then, one might predict that the future will bring a normative
empiricism that fuses the legal scholar’s prescriptive instinct for the way law
changes with a set of powerful empirical tools. One of those tools, using big
data to interrogate relationships, will surely play a more substantial role.155
But computational technology is not the only empirical tool available to
scholars. And, if the comments of Chief Justice Roberts are any indication, it
may take a few more years for the legal profession to grow into the
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See Adam R. Pah, et al., How to build a more open justice system, 369 SCIENCE 134–36 (2020).
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quantitative sophistication needed to make proper use of the insights of
leading statisticians. For a profession in transition, the work of scholars like
Edwin Borchard will remain especially powerful. Using a set of traditional
empirical tools that combined the lessons of history and comparative law,
Borchard’s normative case for the declaratory judgment made a lasting
contribution to law and scholarship. Burbank and Farhang show that,
although the empirical tools may evolve, the crucial spark of normative
insight continues to anchor the best procedure scholarship.

